Blockchain and the General Data Protection Regulation: an irreconcilable regulatory approach? by Cirone, Enza
QMLJ (2021) 2, 15 
DOI: 10.26494/QMLJ3939 
© 2021 The Authors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. 




Abstract A blockchain is a class of technology that allows the creation and management of 
different forms of decentralised and distributed digital ledgers where data are stored, 
chronologically recorded, transferred and finally shared between the ‘nodes’ participating in 
a peer-to-peer network. These features prima facie clash with the GDPR that informs the EU 
data protection legislation and is based on a centralised representation of the reality in which 
data are processed, collected, and recorded in a database controlled by identified subjects. 
The underpinning idea of this article is diametrically opposed to the one which considers the 
technology not GDPR-compliant by default. First, the author argues that the points of tension 
can be mitigated by technical and/or governance methods, thus acting at both application and 
infrastructure level. In essence, a case-by-case analysis is the only feasible option to assess the 
compliance between the regulation and the technology.  Second, a further and closer look at 
blockchain’s underlying concepts reveals how both the GDPR and the blockchain have the 
same purposes but different approaches. More interestingly, the article suggests that the 
blockchain could be seen as a Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET), which might help data 
subjects gain more control over their personal data and hence support one of the GDPR’s 
purposes (recital 7). 
1. Introductory remarks 
Blockchain technology1 has rapidly become the best-known and most widely used 
application of distributed ledger technology (DLT) globally.2 It has been depicted as the 
ultimate disruptive technology since the advent of the internet. As such, it may radically change 
the way socio-economic interactions take place and eventually create great opportunities and 
serious challenges for society.  
 
*PhD Candidate in European and transnational legal studies, University of Florence, enza.cirone@unifi.it. I am 
grateful to the anonymous reviewers as well as to Professor Adelina Adinolfi for her precious comments on a 
draft version of this article. The usual disclaimers apply.  
1 The origins of blockchains can be found in the development of the digital currency, Bitcoin, as outlined in Satoshi 
Nakamoto’s 2008 White Paper (Bitcoin a Peer to Peer Electronic Cash System, 2008, 
<https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf>), in which he (or maybe better to say they) were developing a new form of 
payment through digital means that was a ‘purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash’. See Julie Pitta, Requiem 
for a Bright Idea (1999) Forbes <forbes.com/forbes/1999/1101/6411390a.html#5c162ff0715f>, accessed 25 
January 2021.  
2 Recently, with the tremendous development of crypto-currencies, like - by way of example - Bitcoin, the 




It is essentially an immutable, decentralised and publicly available database 
geographically spread across a network of multiple nodes3 with no central administrator or 
centralised data storage. Any changes to the ledger are reflected in the various copies as a 
consensus algorithm4 is used to check the validity of the information that a node requires adding 
to the chain. Thus, the security and accuracy of the ledger are cryptographically maintained 
according to the rules agreed by the network. This allows for the preservation of data 
confidentiality. However, some critics suggest that ‘unless additional technical means are used 
to protect the confidentiality of online communication, it might result that decentralized 
infrastructure – designed to promote privacy and autonomy – is more vulnerable to 
governmental agencies or corporate scrutiny than their centralized counterparts’.5 
Given these qualities, a multitude of legal questions arise. Especially, how should data 
protection law deal with the developments of this new paradigm?6  
The core technical features of the blockchain clash at first glance with the regulatory 
model informing the European Union’s (EU) data protection legislation. The General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR)7 is a piece of far-reaching privacy legislation designed to 
enhance the protection of personal data and provide individuals with greater control over their 
own data. 
Prima facie, a structural tension seems to exist between the technical underpinning of 
the regulation - the centralised processing of data- and the inherently decentralised nature of 
 
3 For general overview see: William Mougayar, The business blockchain (Hoboken 2016), 17; Aaron Wright and 
Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia (2015) 
<https//ssrn.com/abstract=2580664>. 
4 Miners determine which blocks are to be added to the blockchain, through different consensus protocols. The 
latter make possible for distributed network of peers to store information in a blockchain without the need to rely 
on any centralised operator or middleman. They indeed allow actors on the network to agree on the content 
recorded on the blockchain itself. Proof-of-work and proof-of-stake are the common consensus methods. In proof-
of-work-based blockchains, such as the one used for the Bitcoin, the mining nodes compete to add the next block 
by solving a cryptographically complex calculus that requires a high amount of computational power and electric 
energy. In proof-of-stake-based blockchains, an important factor in determining which node will add to the next 
block is the stake that this node has, that is the amount of token it owns. See Arvind Narayanan, Joseph Bonneau, 
Edward Felten, Andrew Miller, and Steven Godfeder, Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies: A 
Comprehensive Introduction, (Princeton University Press 2016).  
5 Primavera De Filippi, The interplay between decentralization and privacy: the case of blockchain technologies 
(2016) Journal of Peer Production, Issue n.7: Alternative Internets. 
6 Michèle Finck, Blockchains and data protection in the European Union, (2017) MPI Paper,           
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3080322>, 1: [there is] ‘the risk that data protection 
legislation renders the operation of blockchains unlawful, hence asphyxiating the development of an innovative 
technology with much promise for the Digital Single Market’.  
7 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, OJ 




the blockchain technology. The ostensible incompatibility8 between the ‘genetics’ of the 
blockchain and that of the EU data protection legislation triggers the question of whether the 
GDPR, whose provisions are in principle ‘technologically neutral’,9 can guarantee an adequate 
protection to the huge amount of data registered on the blockchain. While the EU Commission 
expects the GDPR to enable ‘innovation to continue to thrive under the new rules’,10 many 
have voiced concerns11 that the GDPR will stifle the innovation of this emerging 
technology.  Similarly, the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs (LIBE) also highlighted that ‘blockchain presents both opportunities and 
challenges in terms of data protection.’ 
Consequently, this article will address some crucial issues arising at the interplay 
between blockchain and data protection, thus outlining the essential characteristics of this topic. 
The overarching aim of this article is to identify and highlight these tensions to understand 
whether the GDPR is able to adequately regulate data processed through this new technology.  
This author essentially argues that GDPR compliance is not about the technology itself 
but is concerned with how the technology is used.  There is no such thing as a GDPR-compliant 
BC technology per se. On the contrary, the article demonstrates that there are only GDPR-
compliant uses of technology.12 
Essentially, the underlying idea is that it is a matter of technological design and 
governance to ensure compliance with (EU) data protection law. The focus is on the principle 
of data protection by design13 which represents a key element to ensure conformity with the 
applicable regulations as it may play a crucial role in building blockchains compliant with data 
protection from their design phase and then throughout their life cycle.14 
 
8EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum (EuBOF), Blockchain and the GDPR (2018) 
<https://www.eublockchainforum.eu/reports>; Aaron Wright and Primavera De Filippi, Blockchain and the Law 
(2018 Harvard University Press); Lucie Munier and Ashley Kemball-Cook, Blockchain and data protection 
regulation: reconciling protection and innovation (2019) Journal of security operations & custody 145, 157; 
Andries Van Humbeeck, The Blockchain-GDPR paradox (2019) Journal of data protection & privacy 208-212; 
European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), Blockchain and the General Data Protection Regulation – 
Can distributed ledgers be squared with European data protection law? (2019) 
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/634445/EPRS_STU(2019)634445_EN.pdf> 
9 Recital 15 of the GDPR.  
10 European Commission, Questions and Answers, Data Protection Reform Package 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_17_1441> 
11 David Meyer, Blockchain technology is on a collision course with EU privacy law (2018) 
<https://iapp.org/news/a/blockchain-technology-is-on-a-collision-course-with-eu-privacy-law/>  
12 Report on Blockchain and the GDPR by EuBOF (2018) (n 8) 4.  
13 EDPB Guidelines 4/2019 on Article 25 Data Protection by Design and by Default adopted on 20 October 2020.  
14 EPRS, Blockchain and the General Data Protection Regulation – Can distributed ledgers be squared with 




On the flip side,15 a closer review of blockchain’s underlying concepts reveals how both 
the GDPR and blockchain technology have the same purposes but different approaches. 
Blockchain may be basically seen as a Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET) 16 structured in 
the form of a Personal Information Management System (PIMS)17 which due to its strong 
encryption of stored data, allows it to operate as a kind of enabler for solutions. This ensures 
wider data protection rights than the GDPR. As a result, data subjects are the central focus and 
operate as active agents of the data governance architecture. This means that data subjects could 
gain stricter control over their personal data while helping data controllers meet the 
requirements imposed by the GDPR (e.g., for the traceability of consent).18  
2. Blockchain in a nutshell  
Based on the above considerations, this section provides an overview of the 
characteristics constituting a blockchain. While a detailed presentation of the features 
underlying this new paradigm19 is beyond the scope of the article, this analysis requires some 
of the technical key mechanisms to be addressed. These include the core concepts of 
decentralisation, transparency, and immutability that are also shared by other distributed-ledger 
technologies. This article will therefore clarify how blockchain works, the function of the 
consensus protocol, and ultimately, the differences among all types of blockchains (i.e. public, 
private and consortium).  
2.1. The three pillars: decentralisation, transparency, and immutability 
First and foremost, any overview of blockchain must commence with the consideration 
that there is not simply just one version of this technology. Rather, blockchains are both a class 
of technology for data storage but also programmable platforms that enable new applications 
 
15 Interestingly, blockchains can also be shaped as decentralised data solutions fitting in the so-called data 
marketplaces, that are digital marketplaces where personal and non-personal data can be traded as commodities 
(for instance, blockchains may enable data sharing without the need of a central trusted intermediary).  
16G.W van Blarkom, J.J Borking, J.G.E. Olk, “PET”, Handbook of Privacy and Privacy-Enhancing Technologies 
(College bescherming persoonsgegevens 2003) 
17 In the Opinion on Personal Information Management Systems (9/2016 – para 49) the European Data Protection 
Supervisor stressed that personal information management systems ‘may facilitate compliance with GDPR’. 
18 See CNIL, Blockchain and the GDPR: Solutions for a responsible use of the blockchain in the context of 
personal data (2018), < https://www.cnil.fr/en/blockchain-and-gdpr-solutions-responsible-use-blockchain-
context-personal-data>. 
19 Arvind Narayanan and Jeremy Clark, Bitcoin’s Academic Pedigree (2017) Communications of the ACM 36: 
rather than being a completely novel technology, blockchain is better known as an inventive combination of 
existing mechanisms. Almost all the components in fact originated in academic research from the 1980s to 1990s 




such as smart contracts.20  As a matter of fact, various definitions of blockchains21 exist and 
they highlight different technical features of the respective forms of data management.  
The term ‘blockchain’22 refers to a technology that allows the creation and management 
of a decentralised and distributed digital ledger in which data, usually called ‘transactions’, is 
stored, recorded in chronological order, transferred and finally shared among the nodes23 
participating in the network. The latter are hardware devices able to communicate with others 
in the so-called peer-to-peer network. 
As a result, a blockchain allows for the storage and transmission of information in a 
transparent and secure manner without the need to rely on a trusted third party. As its 
etymology reveals, it is structured as a series of encrypted blocks24 which are aggregated and 
networked along a chain. A single block groups together multiple transactions that are then 
added to the existing chain of blocks through a hash function. This refers to the process of using 
an algorithm to transform data of any size into a unique fixed-sized output.25 Cryptography26 
 
20 Pieces of code stored on a blockchain that will self-execute once deployed. In more detail: Blaise Carron and 
Valentin Botteron, How smart can a contract be?, in Daniel Kraus, Thierry Obrist and Olivier Hari (eds), 
Blockchains, Smart Contracts, Decentralised Autonomous Organisations and the Law (Edward Elgar 2019). 
21 Given the lack of definitional consensus, the author will use both singular and plural.  
22 Michael Nofer, Peter Gomber, Olivier Hinz and Dirk Schiereck, Blockchain (Business and Information Systems 
Engineering 2017) 183-187; Bikramaditya Singhal, Gautam Dhameja and Priyansu Sekha Panda, Beginning 
Blockchain – a beginner’s guide to building blockchain solutions (Springer 2018); Vikram Dhillon, David Metcalf 
and Max Hooper, Blockchain enabled application (Springer 2017). 
23 Nodes can be divided into full nodes and light nodes. A full node contains a full copy of all the transactions that 
have ever been performed on the blockchain. Accordingly, a ‘mining node’ able to validate the new transactions 
requested by participants always needs to run a full node to select valid transactions to form a new block. Full 
nodes are thus essential to ensure the integrity of a blockchain by downloading and verifying the whole chain of 
blocks. Nonetheless, taking into account that this operation is costly in terms of time and resources, a participant 
that is unwilling to engage in this effort can be a ‘light node’. Light nodes do not interact directly with the 
blockchain but they can send transactions by using full nodes as intermediaries. This enables them to only keep a 
partial copy of the whole chain of transactions.  
24 Each block also contains a “header”: ‘[e]ach block has a block header, a hash pointer to some transaction data 
and a hash pointer to the previous block in the sequence. The second data structure is a per-block tree of all of the 
transactions that are included in that block. This is a Merkle tree and allows us to have a digest of all the 
transactions in the block in an efficient way’. See Arvind Narayanan, Joseph Bonneau, Edward Felten, Andrew 
Miller, and Steven Godfeder, Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies: A Comprehensive Introduction 
(Princeton University Press 2016). 
25 It is relevant to stress that a hash cannot be reversed, thus making it not possible to run the hash functions 
backwards for finding the piece of information based on the string of numbers. Decentralisation in the blockchain 
is reached through a consensus mechanism by which the miners verify and validate the information; once the 
piece of information is validated, it is then chronologically registered in blocks to make the data impossible to be 
altered. However, it is to be noticed that this is true as a matter of principle due to possible exceptions. See Aatif 
Jamshed, Megha Bhardwaj, Medhavi Pandey and Krishna Kant Agrawal, Securing through pseudorandom 
number generator and hashing in cryptography: review (2019) JETIR 203-206. 
26 Another important cryptographic tool is the public key infrastructure (PKI). It enables participants in a 
blockchain to digitally sign transactions while remaining pseudonymous. This is possible because blockchains 
rely on a two-step verification process with asymmetric encryption. Every participant is provided with a pair of 
keys mathematically related one to another: the public and private key (both are strings of letters or numbers 





is indeed a blockchain’s distinctive architectural element and it ensures its immutability. In 
short, this means that, once recorded in a given block, data cannot be retroactively altered, 
unless all subsequent blocks are altered.27  
Accordingly, before being added to the chain, each block has to be checked, validated 
and executed according to the chosen validation protocol (consensus algorithm or consensus 
mechanism).28 The consensus algorithm defines what the validating algorithms are and who 
can be a miner. For example, who can verify the validity of the information that a node contains 
before being added to the blockchain. Thus, the validation protocols are a distinctive element 
of this new technology as they govern how information can be added to the shared repository. 
Namely, it is a method for choosing how blocks are added to the blockchain. They also ensure 
that the content of each block (i.e., transactions) is consistent across the whole network so that 
every node has the same version of the blockchain. To verify the authentication of the 
transactions, digital signature based on asymmetric encryption (public and private keys) is 
generally applied. These are both strings of letters and numbers: the public key represents the 
user while the private key is like a password. The typical digital signature includes two phases: 
the signing phase and the verification phase. When a node creates a transaction, this is signed 
by the node’s private key. Once other nodes receive the transaction, the initiator’s public key 
is used to verify the authentication of the received transaction.29  
 
instead a password usually generated using a secure random function necessarily known only by its owner so as 
to create a digital signature through an algorithm. The mathematical relationship between these keys allows the 
private key to decrypt data encrypted through the public key. This means that once the transaction is digitally 
signed, the public can use the sender’s public key to verify that it was made by the owner of the pair. Therefore, 
other users are enabled to verify that the pseudonymous owner of a public key performed a transaction, but they 
cannot trace the public key back to the private one, unless they add additional information. See Dylan Yaga, Peter 
Mell. Nik Roby and Karen Scarfone, Blockchain Technology Overview (2018) Draft NISTIR US Department of 
Commerce, National Institute for Standards and Technology, 
<https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Publications/nistir/8202/draft/documents/nistir8202-draft.pdf>   
27 This is not completely true and may be misleading, as there are particular and extraordinary circumstances in 
which data can be manipulated. For instance, it is possible that various participants collude to change the state of 
the ledger, but this would be extremely hard and expensive since the blocks are linked through hashes. See, Daniel 
Conte de Leon et al, Blockchain: Properties and Misconceptions (2017) APJIE 286, 290; Kevin Werbach and 
Nicolas Cornell (2017), Contracts Ex Machina (2017) Duke Law Journal 313, 335; Primavera De Filippi and 
Aaron Wright, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia (2015) <https://ssrn. 
Com/abstract=2580664> 4; Michèle Finch, Blockchains: Regulating the Unknown (2018) Ger. Law J. 665, 670. 
28 The consensus mechanisms make possible for distributed network of peers to store information in a blockchain 
without the need to rely on any centralised operator or middleman. See Arvind Narayanan et al, Bitcoin and 
Cryptocurrency Technologies: A Comprehensive Introduction (n 4).  





Blockchain is quite often compared to the Internet.30 However, there is no single model 
or set of standards for blockchain systems that come in different forms and shapes, some of 
which are better suited to deal with data privacy issues more effectively than others.  
There are also broadly three blockchain categories: private, public and consortium31.  
A private blockchain creates a group of known participants who work in a closed but 
decentralised network where access needs to be validated by an organization or entity. Reading 
rights can be granted to nodes that belong to the network or to selected external nodes.   
In public blockchains, anyone can join the network to participate in the consensus 
process, read and access the information, as well as maintain the shared ledger (e.g., Bitcoin 
and Ethereum).  
Consortium blockchains, on the contrary, sit on the fence between public and private 
blockchains, combining elements from both. They are not open systems, considering that a 
predetermined group of nodes can access the network (a minimal number of participants who 
are also known). However, this type of blockchain is at the same time semi-decentralised since 
it runs under the supervision of members from limited groups. Additionally, consortium 
blockchains have multi-party consensus, as all operations are verified by a selected number of 
nodes. Similarly, reading rights can also be controlled here. 
To conclude, permissioned blockchains are open only to predefined subjects, whereas 
permissionless blockchains allow all those who have technical capacity to participate. Private 
and consortium blockchains are mostly (but not necessarily) permissioned, while public 
blockchains are mostly permissionless. This difference will be used further in this article. 
3. Privacy vs decentralisation: State of play 
It is now necessary to review the foundation of data protection law to focus on the 
interplay between blockchains and GDPR. It has already been highlighted that this interaction 
gives rise to a wide range of questions. Since it is not possible to delve into each question, this 
article will address the most significant ones. Before beginning this analysis, an introduction 
to the GDPR is required. 
 
30 See Don Tapscott and Alex Tapscott, Realizing the Potential of Blockchain, A Multistakeholder Approach to 
the Stewardship of Blockchain and Cryptocurrencies, in White Paper, World Economic Forum (2017), 
<www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Realizing_Potential_Blockchain.pdf>: in this report the authors describe BC as 
a new global resource, like the internet, that requires global stewardship.  
31 Ittay Eyal, Adem Efe Gencer, Emin Gun Sirer, and Robbert van Renesse, Bitcoin-ng: A scalable blockchain 
protocol (2016) Proc. 13th USENIX Symposium on NSDI, <https://www.usenix.org/conference/nsdi16/technical-





The GDPR is the EU’s landmark data protection legislation and it represents a proactive 
response to the challenges posed by technological developments. The decision to repeal the 
previous directive32 marks a significant evolution in data protection law. Further, it creates a 
stronger, much more coherent, and harmonised framework for data protection rights recognised 
by primary EU law.33 
The GDPR pursues a twofold objective: it strives to facilitate free movement of 
personal data among the EU’s various Member States while providing a detailed framework to 
give effect to the fundamental right of data protection. However, it is worth noting that this 
right is not absolute and must be balanced against other fundamental rights in conformity with 
the principle of proportionality (article 52 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union34).35 
Because it applies to any personal data of individuals in the EU, the material and 
territorial scope36 of the Regulation is broad. It is nevertheless essential to consider that 
blockchains are not data processing operations by themselves, but rather technology for 
different functions. Hence, the key question is not whether the GDPR applies to the blockchain, 
but more precisely, whether these functions comply with the regulation.  
Relevant experts’ studies identify possible tensions between data protection law and the 
blockchain.37 
First, as already affirmed, immutability is one of the core concepts underlining 
blockchain’s infrastructure. Data is indeed recorded in an immutable manner, so that its erasure 
or modification, in principle, is not possible. This blockchain feature seems to conflict with the 
GDPR’s assumption that data can be erased, or at least modified where necessary, to comply 
with article 16 and 17. Nonetheless, based on interpretative guidance by the European Data 
 
32 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, GU L 281 del 
23.11.1995. 
33 Article 8 of the Charter of fundamental rights, CFR, states that everyone has the right to access personal data 
relating to them, as well as that personal data ‘must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of 
the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law’. Moreover, Article 16 TFEU 
claims that everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them, providing that the Parliament 
and the Council ‘shall lay down the rules relating to the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data by Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and by the Member States when carrying out 
activities which fall within the scope of Union law, and the rules relating to the free movement of such data.’ 
34 2000/C 364/01 
35 Recital 4 GDPR.  
36 Ivi, articles 2 and 3.  
37 EPRS, Blockchain and the General Data Protection Regulation – Can distributed ledgers be squared with 




Protection Board (EDPB) and European Court of Justice (CJEU), data erasure does not entail 
an outright deletion of data. 
Second, to assess compliance with data protection, this section must address the 
identification of the data controller who is responsible for data processing and whom data 
subjects can address to enforce their rights. The definition of roles and the allocation of 
responsibilities could be a real challenge in public permissionless blockchain where there is 
not a single legal entity that makes decisions.38 Furthermore, recent rulings of the CJEU have 
held that joint controllership - which in the GDPR has uncertain contours - is much more 
complicated, particularly in relation to the principle of accountability39 and then to the 
allocation of responsibilities. While there may be a lack of consensus, this article will now 
address whether data stored on the blockchain can be considered personal data.  
Section 3 defines the concept of personal data and the related notions of anonymisation 
and pseudonymisation. This leads to evaluating whether data contained in a blockchain is 
personal data under the GDPR. Secondly, it will assess whether data subjects can invoke the 
right to be forgotten which seems to be difficult to apply to the blockchain system. Finally, the 
article will determine who the GDPR obligations address (i.e., the identification of the data 
controller).  
3.1.  Does data stored on a blockchain qualify as personal data? 
The core of the GDPR is the protection of users’ data.40 Its material scope is wide41 and 
it applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means. In addition, 
 
38 Ivi, 43: ‘Regarding public and permissionless blockchains the given governance arrangements influence the 
modalities of the means of processing. As a general rule, there is not a single legal entity that decides which 
software, hardware and data centers to use. Rather, these decisions are made by a range of different actors. To 
illustrate, in proof-of-work systems, miners make the decision of what hardware (for mining) and data centers (for 
mining) to use whereas core developers suggest whether and if so how software should be updated.300 Depending 
on the chosen governance set-up, miners, nodes and/or coin holders then make a decision as to what software to 
actually implement.’ 
39 Article 5(2) GDPR mandates that the data controller is responsible for and should be able to demonstrate 
compliance with the requirements under Article 5 GDPR.  
40 The GDPR sets out special categories of personal data, whose processing is subject to stricter regulation. These 
more sensitive categories include those data revealing racial or ethnic origins, political opinions, religious beliefs 
and health information. In contrast to the Directive, the GDPR adds special categories of ‘sensitive data’ which 
include both biometric and genetic data.  
41 Article 4 GDPR provides for a broad definition of personal data, namely any information relating to an identified 
or identifiable natural person (i.e. data subject), including names, addresses, identification numbers, location data, 
and IP addresses. Also, the recent ECJ case law has clarified some uncertain aspect of this concept: Case C-582/14 
Patrick Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2016) ECLI:EU:C:2016:779, para 36. On the notion of personal 
data, see also C-434/16 Peter Nowak v. Data Protection Commissioner (2017) ECLI:EU:C:2017:994. In Breyer 
the ECJ considers that even dynamic IP addresses (i.e. provisional addresses which are assigned for each internet 
connection and change from time to time) may also constitute personal data (for more on this ruling refer to 




it applies to non-automated processing of personal data, if the personal data forms part of a 
filing system or is intended for this purpose. 
The relevant criterion to define data as personal is that of identifiability. This is an 
uncertain standard as the regulation does not clarify what elements ought to be adopted to 
assess the risk of identification. In this regard, the distinction between personal and non-
personal data is likely to vanish over time, especially because increasingly advanced 
techniques, together with all the means reasonably likely to be used, must be considered when 
determining a possible risk of re-identification (recital 26).42 
As far as the notion of personal data is concerned, the concepts of anonymisation and 
pseudonymisation43 are of pivotal importance. While anonymous data falls outside the scope 
of the legal framework as it is impossible to trace back information to a living individual, 
pseudonymous data continues to qualify as personal, as long as the indirect identification of a 
natural personal by an identifier remains possible. Anonymisation is defined in the GDPR as 
‘information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal 
data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer 
identifiable’.44 Hence, personal data that has been irreversibly anonymised would not fall 
within the scope of the GDPR. This means that allegedly, the GDPR would not apply. 
It has already been pointed out when explaining permissionless blockchains, that this 
type of blockchain relies on hashing and public/private key cryptography.45 Hashes enable the 
efficient storage of transactions in a format that permits their verification, while public/private 
key cryptography provides the means to validate the sender and the receiver of a transaction. 
Similarly, permissioned blockchains integrate those techniques in their protocols for 
privacy reasons rather than efficiency.  
So, what about personal data in the blockchain environment?46 
 
42 Michèle Finck and Frank Pallas, They who must not be identified—distinguishing personal from non-personal 
data under the GDPR (2020) Int’l Data Privacy Law 11-36. 
43 Art 4(4) GDPR: pseudonymisation is the processing of personal data in such a manner that personal data can 
no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such 
additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical or organizational measures to ensure that the 
information is not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person.  
44 Recital 26 GDPR. In its opinion on Anonymization techniques (05/2014, WP 216) adopted on 10 April 2014, 
the Article 29 Working Party provided guidance on the difference between pseudonymised and anonymised data, 
from which various legal consequences stem. According to the document, in order to qualify data as truly 
anonymous, each anonymisation technique has to be analysed in light of the following three questions: (1) is it 
still possible to single out an individual? (2) is still possible to link records relating to an individual? (3) can 
information concerning an individual be inferred? 
45 (n 26).  
46 The participant identifiers, i.e. the public keys, are essential to the proper functioning of the blockchain, 




Experts and good practice recommend47 not storing personal data in a clear text on the 
blockchain (i.e., off-chain storage) especially in public permissionless blockchain. However, 
there might be business or policy reasons to put personal data directly on the chain. Should this 
be the case, personal data or a commitment or a hash are stored on chain.48 In those cases, two 
risks shall be addressed: the reversal risk – that is the possibility to reverse cryptographic 
processes, so as to reconstitute the original data - and the linkability risk, i.e. the prospect of 
linking encrypted data to an identity through comparison with the original document.  
Indeed, applying those concepts to a decentralised environment triggers the question of 
whether encrypted or hashed personal data is still personal data. The mere use of a hash 
function49 does not automatically entail that the data is anonymous.50 With respect to encrypted 
or hashed data, data is still classified as personal, as it falls under the category of 
pseudonymised data. Essentially, pseudonymisation gives the organisation more leeway for 
processing because the hazards are correspondingly lower. Yet, the European Blockchain 
Observatory and Forum, in an effort to balance different rights, stated that: ‘It would be 
beneficial to the blockchain industry that a hash in this context is not systematically interpreted 
by the EDPB as personal data’.51 In this respect, it is worth mentioning that some hash functions 
– such as ‘salted’ or ‘peppered’ hash – offer stronger privacy safeguards.52 Thus, some argue 
that data complies with the test under recital 26 GDPR (‘means reasonably likely to be used’) 
and does qualify as anonymous data. 
Finally, a note on public keys which are account numbers for each user to share with 
others to enable transactions. Recently, practice has revealed that public keys combined with 
 
47 Jacob Eberhardt and Stefan Tai, On or Off Chain the Blockchain? Insights on Off-Chaining Computation and 
Data (2018), < https://allquantor.at/blockchainbib/pdf/eberhardt2017or.pdf>.  
48 According to the CNIL guidance (n 18), in order to ensure compliance with privacy by design, default and data 
minimisation, solutions where data is processed outside the blockchain are preferable.  
49 (n 25). 
50 In its opinion on Cloud computing (5/2012, WP 196), the Article 29 Working Party sustained that encryption 
‘may significantly contribute to the confidentiality of personal data if implemented correctly’ but ' it does not 
'render personal data irreversibly anonymous.' 
51 Blockchain and the GDPR –The European Union Blockchain Observatory forum (n 8) 30.  
52 Ivi: ‘[These techniques involve] adding extra information to the data to make it large enough that a brute force 




additional information53 can reveal the identity that is hidden behind the address account.54 
Some commentators have noted that public keys may constitute personal data under the 
GDPR.55 The French Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL) and the 
EU Observatory and Forum on Blockchain have reached the same conclusion. The latter, in 
particular, has raised more concerns on the linkability risk.  
While a scrupulous case-by-case analysis is undoubtedly necessary, based on current 
experts’ opinion,56 it can be stated that public keys - directly or indirectly related to an identified 
or identifiable natural person - qualify as personal data under data protection law. Anyhow, to 
prevent the risk of identification, technical and organisational measures need to be taken. 
This analysis provides the foundation for focusing on the implications of blockchain on 
the right to be forgotten in the following section. 
3.2. The right to be forgotten through the prism of blockchain 
Article 5 GDPR builds upon the overarching principles57 governing the regulation and 
provides a set of detailed rights for individuals.58 From a technical perspective, there is no 
 
53 Note that it is possible to trace a parallel with C-582/14, Patrick Breyer vs. Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2016) 
relating to dynamic IP addresses. The Court of Justice stated that dynamic IP addresses collected by an online 
media service provider only constitute personal data if the possibility to combine the address with data necessary 
to identify the user of a website held by a third party (i.e. user’s internet service provider) constitutes a means 
‘likely reasonably to be used to identify’ the individual or a third party, with the caveat that ‘if the identification 
of the data subject was prohibited by law or practically impossible on account of the fact that it requires a 
disproportionate effort in terms of time, cost and man-power, so that the risk of identification appears in reality to 
be insignificant.’  
54 EPRS, Blockchain and the General Data Protection Regulation – Can distributed ledgers be squared with 
European data protection law? (n 8) 27: ‘There have been instances where data subjects have been linked to 
public keys through the voluntary disclosure of their public key to receive funds; through illicit means, or where 
additional information is gathered in accordance with regulatory requirements, such as where cryptoasset 
exchanges perform Know Your Customer and Anti-Money Laundering duties. Wallet services or exchanges may 
indeed need to store parties' real-world identities in order to comply with Anti-Money Laundering requirements 
while counter parties may do so, too for their own commercial purposes’. 
55 Matthias Berberich and Malgorzata Steiner, Blockchain technology and the GDPR – How to Reconcile Privacy 
and Distributed Ledgers? (2016) EDPL 422-426. 
56 EPRS, Blockchain and the General Data Protection Regulation – Can distributed ledgers be squared with 
European data protection law? (n 8) 27.  
57 Without dwelling too long on the subject, it is worth to say that the core privacy principles are lawfulness, 
fairness and transparency towards data subjects; the processing of data has to be made in accordance with the 
purpose for which the data were collected (purpose limitation); information has to be kept accurate and up to date 
(accuracy); the processing has to be limited to what is necessary (data minimization); the integrity and security of 
the data have to be guaranteed (integrity and confidentiality), and finally data have to be stored for no longer than 
necessary. 




friction with the right to access59 and the right to data portability.60 The exact application and 
respect of these rights are not so problematic in the blockchain environment. Indeed, the article 
argues that data portability solutions could help data subjects gain more control over sharing 
their personal information.  
Things may become complicated in respect of the right to be forgotten and the right of 
rectification,61 as they seem barely compatible with the decentralised structure of such a 
blockchain system where data once registered cannot be deleted or amended.  
In essence, the main feature of the blockchain (strong immutability and inalterability) 
may fully collide with the intrinsic assumptions of those rights. This conflict - surely 
exacerbated when it comes to public permissionless blockchain - is rooted in two 
fundamentally different philosophies/ontologies on how to best protect data privacy. 
On the one hand, the GDPR has broadened the scope of the right to be forgotten, which 
was already recognised in case law.62 The GDPR empowers any data subject to ask for the 
correction or even deletion of personal data that affects them when one of the grounds listed in 
article 17 applies. In that case, the controller has the obligation to erase that personal data 
without undue delay.  
Nonetheless, the right to be forgotten is not an unconditional right and many exceptions 
apply, so the data subject does not have an absolute right to obtain the erasure of data 
concerning them as they please. 
On the other hand, the GDPR does not specify what qualifies as ‘erasure’. 63 It seems 
that the obligation inherent to article 17 GDPR does not have to be necessarily interpreted as 
 
59 Pursuant to the right of access, the data subject shall have the right to obtain confirmation from the controller 
as to whether personal data concerning them are being processed, and, where that is the case, to access such data 
and receive some additional information (including what the purpose of the processing is and who the recipients 
or categories of recipient are to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed).  
60 The right to data portability, recognised for the first time in the GDPR, allows individuals to obtain and reuse 
their personal data for their own purposes across different services in a commonly used and machine-readable 
format. It provides data subjects with the possibility to move, copy or transfer personal data easily from one IT 
environment to another in a safe and secure way, without affecting its usability. In addition, the data subjects have 
the right to transmit those data to another controller without hindrance from the controller to whom the personal 
data have been provided.  
61 Article 16 GDPR provides the data subject with the right to obtain from the controller the rectification of 
inaccurate personal data concerning them without undue delay. 
62 C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, Mario Costeja Gonzàles 
(2014) ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 in this case the delisting of information from research results was considered to 
amount to erasure. 
63 The GDPR is a regulation, so it does not require implementation under article 288 TFUE. Nevertheless, there 
is the possibility that certain national laws implement the notion of ‘erasure’; for instance, the German framework 
provides that data is not deleted in cases of non-automated processing if the specific mode of storage makes it 
possible (Article 35 of the Gesetz zur Anpassung des Datenschutzrechts an die Verordnung (EU) 2016/679 and 




requiring the outright destruction of data. 64  Similarly, the qualified right to erasure does not 
oblige blockchain members to delete personal data if a valid purpose still exists to process that 
data. This right may be ensured on a granular level by considering the impact on and of various 
technologies.65  
The question of whether ‘erasure’ always amounts to destruction per se is unclear, even 
if case law and interpretative guidance indicates that it does not. According to a recent EPRS 
report, the issue that originated the case Google Spain ‘[…] may be taken as an indication that 
what the GDPR requires is the obligation resting on data controllers to do all they can to secure 
a result as close as possible to the destruction of their data within the limits of their own factual 
possibilities.’66 The delisting of information from search results was indeed considered to 
amount to erasure, although it was the only request the applicant made to Google. 
Furthermore, what also emerges from the above-mentioned report is that erasure does 
not mean destruction. This was also submitted by the Cloud Computing Opinion of the Article 
29 Working Party,67 as well as by considerable data protection authorities (particularly the 
Austrian68 and the UK69 Data Protection Authorities (DPAs)). They all agree that these 
technical solutions may be satisfactory.  
However, there is no consensus among DPAs. Thus, the question still arises whether 
the threshold of erasure under the GDPR can be met without erasure itself occurring in the 
literal sense. Regulatory and/or interpretive guidance are much needed. 
In the meantime, some practical solutions implementing the ‘right to erasure’ on  
blockchain can be explored. The following remarks are based on the idea that the right of 
erasure does not equate to a complete destruction of data. Further, the protection of data subject 
 
64 In its opinion on cloud computing, the Article 29 WP (Opinion 5/2012 on Cloud computing, WP 196 
01037/12/EN, 12) considered that the destruction of hardware could qualify as erasure for the purpose of Article 
17 GDPR. Therefore, the EDPB’s Guidelines on the Criteria of the Right to be Forgotten in the Search Engine 
Cases, n. 5/2019 clarify that a request by an individual under Article 17 GDPR entails the delisting of particular 
content that would not involve their personal data being completely deleted. Pursuant to the Guidelines, the right 
to be forgotten does not usually require that personal data be erased from the source website, nor from the indexes 
or caches of the search engine operator.  
65 Article 17(2) GDPR provides that, if faced with a request for erasure, the data controller shall take ‘account of 
available technology and the cost of implementation’ when data are public and processed by other controllers. 
Hence, the question arises as to whether the notion of ‘available technology’ – which leaves room for a broad 
interpretation - could be understood in a way that leads to alternative solutions to the outright erasure. 
66 EPRS, Blockchain and the General Data Protection Regulation – Can distributed ledger be squared with 
European Data Protection Law? (n 8) 76. 
67 (n 47).  
68 Austrian Data Protection Authority, DSB-D123.270/0009-DSB/2018 (05 December 2018) 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Dsk/DSBT_20181205_DSB_D123_270_0009_DSB_2018_00/DSBT_20






can be achieved by severing the link between personal data stored on the blockchain and 
original information. Thus, it is worth considering both the aforementioned recommendations 
on pros and cons of on chain/off-chain storage solutions and the suggestions on responsibilities 
of the platforms stemming from the Google Spain case. 
In Google Spain, the delisting of information from search results was considered 
sufficient.  By analogy, the application of the ECJ case law to the blockchain environment 
lends itself to affirming that, in practice, the deletion of data may be required from the data 
controller of the blockchain’s applications who will erase data stored off-chain.  According to 
the EPRS report: ‘This may be taken as an indication that what the GDPR requires is that the 
obligation resting on data controllers is to do all they can to secure a result as close as possible 
to the destruction of their data within the limits of their own factual possibilities’.70 
Another solution is to destroy the private key that decrypts personal data stored on 
chain. Both options exclude the possibility to reverse and/or link the encrypted value stored on 
chain with the original information.  
A parallel rationale applies to the right of rectification: the updated data can be entered 
in a new block, even though the first transaction will still be visible; nevertheless, data in the 
first block can be made inaccessible.71 
Beyond the difficulties surrounding the right to be forgotten, other related concerns are 
grounded in the issue of identifying the roles prescribed under data protection law. Indeed, 
there is the idea that within a blockchain-enabled data processing operation it is not possible to 
determine the identity of the data controller (and possibly the data processor). Thus, the article 
argues that these concepts should be functional and based on a factual rather than formal 
analysis as the determination of controllership is informed by ‘an actual activity [of the 
participant] in a specific situation, rather upon formal designation.’72 
3.3.Who is the data controller? 
The GDPR73 is technology neutral and defines the data controller as the natural or legal 
person who ‘determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data’. The 
 
70 EPRS, Blockchain and the General Data Protection Regulation – Can distributed ledger be squared with 
European Data Protection Law? (n 8) 76.  
71 CNIL report (n 18) 9.  
72 EDPB, Guidelines on the concepts of controller and processor in the GDPR (07/2020),   
<https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/public-consultations-art-704/2020/guidelines-072020-concepts-
controller-and-processor_it>  
73 To complete the “player’s list”, it is necessary to add references to the data processor who, pursuant to article 
4(8) GDPR, is ‘a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes personal data on 
behalf of the controller’. However, not every personal data processing operation necessarily involves a data 




identification of the controller (or the joint controllers)74 is far from a purely theoretical issue. 
It is crucial for two reasons. Firstly, it guarantees the respect of the principle of accountability75 
by clarifying who must comply with the GDPR obligations.76 Secondly, it allocates the 
responsibilities for ensuring the rights of data subjects. 
The identification of the data controller is certainly complicated due to the 
decentralisation of control over data at network level. In this respect, there is no agreement on 
who should be the controller of a given blockchain-enabled data processing operation. Most of 
the expert studies77 fall short of providing an affirmative definition of who qualifies as data 
controller in blockchain infrastructures. The analysis reveals that ‘controllership cannot be 
determined in a generalised manner [so] a case-by-case analysis accounting for technical and 
contextual factors ought to be carried out.’78 Arguably, the remarks formulated by the French 
DPA (CNIL) may help solve the issue. 
As stated above, permissionless and permissioned blockchains differ by the degree of 
decentralisation. When dealing with permissionless blockchain networks, it is much more 
difficult to identify the data controller as these are widely distributed open networks and all 
users are engaged in the data processing. There is thus no central operator or administrator who 
determines both purposes and means of data processing.  
Given the fact that nodes have access to all data, it has been suggested that they may be 
controllers79 because they are not subject to external instructions, but rather autonomously 
 
74 At articles 4(7) and 26, the Regulation also defines the joint controller, i.e. the person who - together with the 
data controller - determines the purposes and means of the processing, as well as their respective responsibilities 
for compliance with the obligations under the GDPR. For more on the issue, see J.P. Pesch and Christian Sillaber, 
‘Distributed Ledger, Joint Control? – Blockchains and the GDPR’s Transparency Requirements (2017) Comput. 
Law Rev. Int. 169-171; and also Case C–40/17 Fashion ID GmbH & Co. KG v. Verbraucherzentrale NRW eV 
(2019) ECLI:EU:C:2019:629; Case C210/16 Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein (2018) 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:388; Case C-25/17, Jehovah’s Witnesses (2018) ECLI:EU:C:2018:551. 
75 Ricardo Neisse, Gary Steri and Igor Nai-Fovino, A Blockchain-based Approach for Data Accountability and 
Provenance Tracking (2017) EC JRC; Uwe Roth, Blockchain Ensures Transparency in Personal Data Usage: 
Being Ready for the New EU General Data Protection Regulation in Special Theme: Blockchain Engineering 
(2017) ERCIM News 32; Edward Felten  Blockchain: What is it good for? (2018) <https://freedom-to-
tinker.com/2018/02/26/bloc>.  
76 Among others: informing data subjects of what is happening with their data and ensuring they have means and 
knowledge to exercise their rights; conducting data-protection impact assessments, which according to article 35 
GDPR are ‘an assessment of the impact of the envisaged processing operations on the protection of personal data’.  
77 See, Blockchain and the GDPR –The European Union Blockchain Observatory (n 18) 17-18; EPRS, Blockchain 
and the General Data Protection Regulation – Can distributed ledgers be squared with European data protection 
law? (n 8) 44-51.  
78 Ivi, 52.  
79 J.P Pesch and Christian Sillaber, Distributed Ledger, Joint Control? – Blockchains and the GDPR’s 
Transparency Requirements (n 74) 169: ‘in the absence of central governance, [each participant] is free to choose 
and configure their hard- and software and to define internal data protection policies, every participant at least 





decide whether to join the chain. This hypothesis overlooks the fact that nodes only contribute 
to the practical maintenance of the system. It seems much more reasonable to consider the 
identity as a data controller with a written permission (e.g., a notary who uploads a document 
received from a client on the blockchain).  This view is also shared by the CNIL. 
Nonetheless, other authors when considering the decentralised nature of blockchains’ 
system argue that nodes might also act as processors due to the fact that the entire transactional 
history is stored on the blockchain.80 
It is widely agreed that miners are not data controllers. They only validate transactions 
requested by participants. Thus, they are not involved in the definition of the purposes and 
means of the processing. It is still worth noting that ‘they exercise control over the means in 
choosing which version of the protocol to run’.81 Further, ‘as such their role has been compared 
to that of telecommunication providers that are not legally liable for the content of the data they 
transmit.’ 82 
Experts argue that users can be considered data controllers when they directly make the 
transaction and submit personal data to the chain as part of a business activity.83 Indeed, they 
are the only persons able to determine the purposes and influence the means of data processing 
(such as the format of the data and the choice to use a blockchain instead of other technology). 
To deepen these reflections, it can be added that this scenario – namely users submitting 
information for business purposes – ought to be distinguished from the case where users send 
their own data for personal use. In such a case, it is not guaranteed whether they are likely to 
fall under the ‘household’ exemption84 if a public and permissionless blockchain is used. Data 
is in fact shared with an indefinite number of persons. 
 
controllers according to the GDPR’. See also EPRS, Blockchain and the General Data Protection Regulation – 
Can distributed ledgers be squared with European data protection law? (n 8) 47: ‘each node that initiates a 
transaction or that saves a transaction in its own copy of the database is a controller, considering that in doing so, 
the node pursues its own purpose: participation in the network.’  
80 European Parliament, Report on Blockchain: a Forward-Looking Trade Policy (2018) A8-0407/2018, 22.  
Also, some academics [here no academic sources are sited, only EU reports – to add] have suggested that nodes 
could be seen as joint controllers, as they ‘have equal influence and freedom to choose (or start) a certain 
blockchain-network— and can [in certain instances] change the rules’ of the network (EPRS, Blockchain and the 
General Data Protection Regulation – Can distributed ledgers be squared with European data protection law? 
(n 8) 47). 
81 Ivi, 46. 
82 Ibidem. 
83 As the CNIL pinpointed (n 18, 3), in such scenario the household exemption (i.e. under article 2 GDPR) does 
not apply because the purpose of the transaction is professional or commercial.  
84 Article 2(2)(c) GDPR. According to Christopher Kuner, Lee A. Bygrave, Christopher Docksey, The EU General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) – A commentary (2020 Oxford University Press): ‘It follows from both 
Lindqvist and Ryneš that the exclusion of purely personal or house- hold activities must be interpreted as covering 





As regards the possible overlap between data subject and data controller, it is ‘an open 
question whether [this] would be compatible with the broader underlying objective of the 
GDPR, which was designed precisely to give data subjects rights vis-à-vis controllers in a 
context of unbalanced power-relations.’85 This intersection can be seen from two perspectives. 
First, the overlap may shift responsibility to users who might be unaware of the complex data 
processing implications. Second, it may help data subjects strengthen the management system 
of their personal data in view of furthering data sovereignty. While these insights are helpful,   
additional clarification is  required. 
It is important to note, by way of conclusion, that the GDPR's broad definition of 
controllership has far-reaching implications for personal data processing based on DLT. 
The current state of the law makes it very difficult to distinguish between different roles 
due to blockchain design and governance features86 that apparently hamper the identification.87 
4. Privacy-enhancing solutions: an overview  
In addition to explaining the points of tension between blockchains and GDPR, this 
article further shows that the technology can be developed to be data-protection law-compliant 
through the application of the principle of privacy by design.  
The underpinning argument of the article is that the blockchain can be structured to 
support advanced techniques implementing privacy-enhancing solutions for decentralised data 
management. This can therefore increase the autonomy and ownership of data subjects. 
The idea of shaping technology according to data protection principles – among others 
data minimisation and privacy by design and by default - is not new and it leads to the term 
Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs). This refers to a range of technologies designed to 
support data protection and privacy. In this regard, recital 7 GDPR foresees that ‘[n]atural 
persons should have control of their own personal data’. The same logic is evident regarding 
 
activity cannot be regarded as being purely personal or domestic where its purpose is to make the data collected 
accessible to an unrestricted number of people or where that activity extends, even partially, to a public space and 
is accordingly directed outwards from the private set- ting of the person processing the data in that manner.’  
85EPRS, Blockchain and the General Data Protection Regulation – Can distributed ledgers be squared with 
European data protection law? (n 8) 50. 
86Michèle Finck, Blockchain Regulation and Governance in Europe (2019 Cambridge University Press); 
European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document on the free flow of data and emerging issues of the 
European Data Economy’ (SWD/2017/02 final). 
87EPRS, Blockchain and the General Data Protection Regulation – Can distributed ledgers be squared with 
European data protection law? (n 8) 55: ‘The current state of the law makes it moreover difficult to distinguish 
between data controllers and data processors. The combination of DLT's polycentric design and the current state 





data subject rights such as the right to data portability (article 20) and right to access (article 
15). These articles give data subjects control over what the data controller (or others) do with 
personal data relating to them as well as the possibility to decide on who should have access to 
their personal data. 
An increasing amount of guidance and reports have addressed the issue of applying the 
GDPR to a decentralised data system such as blockchain. The foundation for all these 
documents issued by, among others, the European Data Protection Board, European 
Parliament,88 European Data Protection Supervisor89 and Data Protection Authorities (CNIL in 
particular) is that the technology might be a useful tool to achieve some of the GDPR’s 
underlying objectives while preserving the blockchains’ characteristics of a trusted and human-
centred infrastructure. 
The European Parliament indeed defined the DLT system as a ‘tool that promotes the 
empowerment of citizens by giving them the opportunity to control their own data and decide 
what data to share in the ledger, as well as the capacity to choose who else can see them.’90 At 
the same time, it stressed the importance of a decentralised system for self-sovereignty, 
identity, and trust, thus postulating the privacy-enhancing potential of blockchain and DLT in 
general. 
At EU level, there is a wide range of projects demonstrating that blockchain can be used 
to achieve these objectives. An example is the Decode Project, whose slogan is ‘Giving people 
ownership of their personal data.’ The project seeks to provide tools that ‘put individuals in 
control of whether they keep their personal data private or share it for the public good’.91 The 
goal is also shared by the MyHealthMyData project92 which features a data management 
structure where data subjects can allow, refuse and withdraw access to their sensitive data based 
on different cases of potential use. Security and data protection are accordingly increased, and 
this is of paramount importance in sectors like health data management which require both 
more attention due to the sensitivity of data processed and a faster pace to achieve processing 
purposes (as the Covid-19 pandemic has shown). 
This brief overview has highlighted that there is an open and vivid debate on the 
development of tools capable of achieving GDPR objectives. These projects reveal that it is 
 
88 Opinion of the Libe Committee for the Committee on International Trade on blockchain: a forward-looking 
trade policy, European Parliament (2018/2085(INI)); EP Resolution of 3 October 2018 on distributed ledger 
technologies and blockchains: building trust with disintermediation, P8TA(2018)0373. 
89 European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion 9/2016 on Personal Information Management Systems (n 17). 
90 EP Resolution of 3 October 2018 (n 87) A. 
91 https://decodeproject.eu/. 




possible to use blockchain to minimise the risk of manipulation and even gain more control 
over personal information. It is, however, clear that we are not talking about an automatic 
mechanism, rather the focus is on ad hoc solutions and use cases. Each tool needs to be assessed 
on its own merits on a case-by-case analysis. 
In conclusion, when it comes to evaluating GDPR compliance, while it is possible to 
set some key requirements, it is not feasible to state whether a technology or a use case is by 
default data-protection compliant. 
5. Final remarks and key takeaways 
At first glance, some GDPR provisions seem ontologically incompatible with the main 
blockchain characteristics. Hence, manifold points of tension have been identified.  
This article focused on three overarching questions that the author considers the most 
challenging, (i) does data stored on blockchain fall within the scope of the GDPR? (ii) should 
the right to be forgotten be abandoned due to the blockchain’s immutability? (iii) who is the 
data controller in blockchains? 
It is against this backdrop that possible solutions based on living technologies have been 
outlined and the idea that the blockchain can serve as enabler to achieve GDPR’s objectives 
has been finally illustrated. Both the technology and the regulation share the purpose of 
strengthening data subjects’ control over their personal data. At this stage, some EU-supported 
projects already exist that explore technical and governance solution to use blockchain as a 
privacy enhancing technology.93 
It is worth noting that the starting point for any of the above considerations and, 
specifically, the argument progressed in this article, is that the interplay between blockchains 
and GDPR can only be assessed by adopting a case-by-case analysis. Furthermore, the article 
elaborated on some considerations regarding the fact that permissioned blockchains appear to 
be more suitable for the regulation. 
Whereas some have called for a revision of the regulation claiming it is already 
outdated,94 the article argued that the technological neutral structure of the GDPR allows for a 
different interpretation of some of its requirements and provisions. Regulatory flexibility might 
be the key to address those issues. The most illustrative example is that of the right to be 
forgotten which can be interpreted in as many different ways as there are different definitions 
 
93 Decode and MyHealthMyData projects (n 90-91).  
94 Some authors sustained that, even before the GDPR entered into force, it was already partly outdated: see for 




of ‘erasure’. Thus, an initiative by the regulators or interpretative guidance by DPAs are 
necessary to shed light on those (arguable) problems. 
Another essential point to focus on is that the regulation and the blockchain should 
foster a dialogue when the technology is in the design phase. This means that regulators and 
developers must come to a mutual understanding on how to blend privacy controls with 
transparent transactions. This may be possible following the principles set out in the regulation, 
notably data protection by design and data protection by default. Pursuant to article 25 GDPR, 
data controllers shall implement technical and organizational measures to comply with EU data 
protection principles. These obligations are closely related to the data-controller accountability 
clause (articles 5(2) and 24 GDPR). 
However, it is necessary to note that neither the text nor context of privacy-by-design 
provision offer any clarity about requirements, scope, or limitations.95 Hence, only a 
teleological reasoning can offer a way forward in the following directions: on the one hand, 
regulators must incentivise developers to safeguard established fundamental rights and provide 
guidance on how to build GDPR compliant systems. Blockchain innovators, on the other hand, 
must be given freedom to develop their products while respecting regulatory principles. 
The author ultimately affirms that, when it comes to identification of data-protection 
implications of blockchain technology, it is essential to consider two aspects before drawing 
any conclusion. First, the technology is still under development, meaning that nothing is 
definitive. Second, there is a lack of standards and consistent interpretation on both the main 
aspects of the technology and some data protection requirements (i.e., what they actually entail, 
to what extent they can be interpreted). Thus, the intersection of blockchain technology and the 
GDPR remains ambiguous. Consequently, as some claim ‘the legal framework set up by the 
GDPR is still in its infancy’,96 this article suggests that the debate has merely begun. 
 
95 Ezra Waldman, Data Protection by Design? A Critique of Article 25 of the GDPR (2018) Cornell Int. Law J 
147, 148.  
96 Opinion of Advocate General Bobek, C-645/19, Facebook V. Belgium DPA (2021) ECLI:EU:C:2021:5, para. 
12. 
